This paper integrates theories of political budget cycles with theories of tactical electoral redistribution to test for political capture in a novel way. Studying banks in India, I …nd that government-owned bank lending tracks the electoral cycle, with agricultural credit increasing by 5-10 percentage points in an election year. There is signi…cant cross-sectional targeting, with large increases in districts in which the election is particularly close. This targeting does not occur in non-election years, or in private bank lending. I show capture is costly: elections a¤ect loan repayment, and election year credit booms do not measurably a¤ect agricultural output.
Introduction
While there is limited evidence that government intervention in markets may improve welfare, there is also convincing evidence that government institutions are subject to political capture. However, less is known about the economic and political implications of capture: How does capture work? What explains the temporal and cross-sectional variation in capture? Is it costly?
This paper presents evidence that government-owned banks in India serve the electoral interests of politicians, and analyzes how resources are strategically distributed. The identi…cation strategy is straightforward: the Indian constitution requires states to hold elections every …ve years. I therefore compare lending in years prior to scheduled elections, to lending in o¤-election years.
1 To test for cross-sectional capture, I use state elections data to measure whether credit levels in a district vary with amount of electoral support for the incumbent party. Finally, combining these two theories, I determine whether the observed cross-sectional relationships vary with the electoral cycle.
I …nd compelling evidence of political capture. Agricultural credit lent by public banks is substantially higher in election years. More loans are made in districts in which the ruling state party had a narrow margin of victory (or a narrow loss), than in less competitive districts. This targeting is not observed in o¤-election years, or in private bank lending. Political interference is costly: defaults increase around election time.
Moreover, agricultural lending booms do not a¤ect agricultural investment or output.
This paper contributes to three literatures. A relatively recent body of empirical work evaluates how government ownership of banks a¤ects …nancial development and economic growth. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2002) demonstrate that government ownership of banks is prevalent in both developing and developed countries, and is associated with slower …nancial development and slower growth. Cole (2007) exploits a natural experiment to measure the e¤ects of bank nationalization in 1 As in most parliamentary democracies, elections may be called early. As described in section 3.2, I
use the …ve-year constitutional schedule as an instrument for actual elections.
India. I …nd that government ownership leads to lower interest rates, lower quality …nan-cial intermediation, and that nationalization slowed …nancial development and economic growth.
Two other papers use loan-level data sets to explore the behavior of public sector banks. Paola Sapienza (2004) …nds that Italian public banks charge interest rates approximately 50 basis points lower than private banks, and …nds a correlation between electoral results and interest rates charged by politically-a¢ liated banks. Asim I. Khwaja and Atif R. Mian (2005) …nd that Pakistani politicians enrich themselves and their …rms by borrowing from government banks and defaulting on loans.
The second literature is on political budget cycles. Relative to the existing literature, this paper provides a particularly clean test of cyclical manipulation. First, because Indian state elections are not synchronized, I can exploit within-India variation in the relationship between electoral cycles and credit, and thus rule out macroeconomic ‡uctuations as a possible explanation for cycles. Second, the interpretation of observed cycles for agricultural credit is particularly clear. Agricultural lending in India is ostensibly entirely unrelated to the political process: banks are corporate entities, with an o¢ cial mandate to operate in a commercial manner. Absent political considerations, banks should not exhibit electoral cycles.
Two recent papers are related to this present work. A paper by Serdar Dinc (2005) examines lending of public and private sector banks in a large cross-country sample. Dinc …nds that in election years, the growth rate of credit from private banks slows, while the growth rate of government-owned banks remains constant. Marianne Bertrand et. al. (2004) study …rm behavior in France, and …nd that …rms with politically connected
CEOs strategically hire and …re around election years: this e¤ect is strongest in politically competive regions.
Finally, this paper provides a compelling test of theories of politically-motivated redistribution. Compared to previous studies, this paper o¤ers several bene…ts. A signi…cantly larger sample, with 412 districts over eight years, with 32 elections, allows district …xed-e¤ects. We observe decisions made by over 45,000 public sector banks, disbursing millions of loans. Credit varies continuosly, adjusts quickly, and repayment rates are observable.
The combination of cross-sectional and time-series analysis represents a signi…cant methodological improvement in tools used to identify electorally-motivated redistribution.
There are several reasons, unrelated to tactical distribution, that could explain a crosssectional relationship between electoral outcomes and redistribution. There are other explanations, again unrelated to political goals, that could explain time-series variation.
However, none of these reasons could explain why we would observe a cross-sectional relationship in election years, but not in o¤-election years.
A second substantive contribution of this paper is to identify the costs of tactical redistribution. Perhaps the threat of upcoming elections simply causes politicians to behave more closely in line with the public interest. For example, Akhmed Akhmedov and Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya (2004) demonstrate that politicians pay back wages prior to elections. If political intervention simply shifts resources from one group to another, but both groups use resources e¢ ciently, then reducing the scope for intervention has implications for equity, but not aggregate output. On the other hand, if the targeted credit is not productively employed, the costs of redistribution may be substantial. A similar question can be asked about cycles: are observed spending booms squandered on projects with little return, or are the funds put to good use? The answers to these questions are essential to understanding whether tactical redistribution is merely a minor cost of the democratic process, or is so costly that it may be desirable to substantially circumscribe the latitude of governments to intervene in the economy.
I note two limitations to the data. First, the time panel of only 8 years is shorter than would be ideal for estimating political cycles. This drawback is mitigated to some extent by the fact that we observe elections in 19 states, which are not synchronized with each other. Second, the credit data are observed at the administrative district level, while electoral competition occurs at the smaller, constituency, level.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I brie ‡y describe the context of banking and politics in India, including the mechanisms by which politicians may in ‡uence banks. In Section 2.3, I discuss competing theories of political redistribution, and their testable predictions. Section 3 develops the empirical strategy and presents the main results of political capture. In Section 4, I establish that these political manipulations are socially costly: increases in government agricultural credit do not a¤ect agricultural output. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Indian Context and Redistribution
Banking in India
Government planning and regulation were key components of India's post-independence development strategy, particularly in the …nancial sector. Three government policies stand out. First and foremost, the government nationalized many private banks in 1969 and 1980. Second, both public and private banks were required to lend at least a certain percentage of credit to agriculture and small-scale industry. Finally, a branch expansion policy obliged banks to open four branches in unbanked locations for every branch opened in a location in which a bank was already present.
The three policies had a substantial e¤ect on India's banking system, making it an attractive target for government capture. The branch expansion policy increased the scope of banking in India to a scale unique to its level of development: in 2000, India had over 60,000 bank branches (both public and private), located in every district across the country. Nationalized banks increased the availability of credit in rural areas and for agricultural uses. Robin , and Burgess, Pande, and Grace Wong (2005) show that the redistributive nature of branch expansion led to a substantial decline in poverty among India's rural population. However, these government policies also made public sector banks very attractive targets for capture: public banks did not face hard budget constraints, were subject to political regulation, and were present throughout India. April of 1969, the central government, to increase its control over the banking system, nationalized the 14 largest private banks with deposits greater than Rs. 500 million.
These banks comprised 54% of the bank branches in India at the time. The rationale for nationalization was given in the 1969 Bank Nationalization Act: "an institution such as the banking system which touches and should touch the lives of millions has to be inspired by a larger social purpose and has to subserve national priorities and objectives such as rapid growth in agriculture, small industry and exports, raising of employment levels, encouragement of new entrepreneurs and the development of the backward areas. For this purpose it is necessary for the Government to take direct responsibility for extension and diversi…cation of the banking services and for the working of a substantial part of the banking system."
2
In 1980, the government of India undertook a second wave of nationalization, by taking control of all banks whose deposits were greater than Rs. 2 billion. Nationalized banks remained corporate entities, retaining most of their sta¤, with the exception of the board of directors, who were replaced by appointees of the government. The political appointments included representatives from the government, industry, agriculture, as well as the public.
2 Quoted in .
Politics in India
India has a federal structure, with both national and state assemblies. 
Politically Motivated Redistribution
The literature on targeted redistribution distinguishes betwen patronage, which invovles rewarding supporters, and tactical redistribution, which is made to acheive electoral or political goals (Avinash K. Dixit and John B. Londregan, 1996, Snyder, 1989 , and Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, 1986) . "Patronage" invovles awarding areas in which the ruling party enjoys more support a disproportionate amount of resources, irrespective of electoral goals. "Tactical redistribution" predicts resource allocation will follow one of two patterns: resources will be targeted towards "swing" districts, or politicians will disproportionately reward their supporters.
Empirically distinguishing between the theoretical models is di¢ cult for several rea- I measure political outcomes in a district by using the margin of victory of the incumbent ruling party. 10 All members of parties aligned with the majority coalition were coded as "majority." 11 Because credit data are observed at the district level, vote shares are also aggregated to the district level. I use as a measure of ruling party strength, M dt ;
the average margin of victory of the state ruling party in a district. The median district has 9 legislative assembly constituencies.
There are two important limitations to this dataset. First, the time panel is relatively short (8 years), which is not ideal for estimating a …ve-year cycle. I focus on standard 9 Banks were allowed to report loans smaller than Rs. 25,000 (ca. $625) in an aggregated fashion until 1999, at which point loans below Rs. 200,000 (ca. $5,000) were reported as aggregates. 10 If the majority party did not …eld a candidate, I de…ne the margin of victory for the majority party to be the negative of the vote share of the winning candidate. If the majority party candidate ran unopposed, I de…ne the margin of victory to be 100. If no party held a majority of the seats, the ruling coalition is identi…ed from new reports in the Times of India.
11 The theoretical models of redistribution derived below were motivated by a two-party system. While India has many parties, I am careful to code all members of the ruling coalition as Majority Party.
Moreover, Pradeep K. Chhibber and Ken Kollman (1998) document that while India often had more than two parties at the national level, in local elections, the political system closely resembled a twoparty system. panel estimation, using log credit as the dependent variable. A large share of agricultural credit is short-term loans, with maturation of less than a year. The median and mean rate of real agricultural credit growth for public banks is zero over the period studied. In a previous version of this paper (available on request) I show that the results are robust to estimation in changes, as well as to estimation in a dynamic panel setting, using the GMM technique developed by Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) . I discuss this concern in greater detail in the next section.
Second, the data are observed at the administrative district level, while electoral constituencies are typically smaller than a district. Di¤erent methods of aggreation (described below) yield very similar results. Indeed, the district level may be the appropriate level of analysis, as the political committees that in ‡uence credit meet at the district level.
Moreover, credit itself may cross constituency boundaries: the district of Mumbai has 34 constituencies and 1,581 bank branches. 
Political Cycle Results

The Amount of Credit
The simplest approach to test for temporal manipulation is to compare the amount of credit issued in election years to the amount issued in non-election years. I include district …xed-e¤ects to control for time-invariant characteristics in a district that a¤ect credit. The
Reserve Bank of India divides states in India into six regions. Region-year …xed e¤ects ( rt ) control for macroeconomic ‡uctuations. 13 Finally, I include the average rainfall in 12 Matching credit data to constituencies would require substantial e¤ort. However, identifying credit "leakages" outside the targeted constituency would allow a test of the electoral impact of additional credit, using a methodology similar to Steven Levitt and James M. Snyder (1997) . I leave this for future research. 13 All results presented here are robust to using year, rather than region*year …xed e¤ects. State*year …xed e¤ects would of course be collinear with the election variables. Results are also robust to including or excluding rainfall, which is the only time-varying variable available at the district level. Finally, results are robust to including a district-speci…c linear time trend.
the previous 12 months in district t (Rain dt ). Formally, I regress:
where y dt is the log level of credit, d is a district …xed-e¤ect, and E st is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the state s had an election in year t. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level.
14 While the constitution mandates elections be held every …ve years, the timing is subject to some slippage: in the sample, one fourth of elections (10 out 
Because elections are required after four years without an election, S 0 st is a powerful predictor of elections. In the …rst-stage regression, the estimated coe¢ cient is 0.99, with a standard error of 0.01. This …rst stage explains 86% of the variation in election years, because early elections are not common. 15 An alternative IV strategy would only use information on election timing prior to 1990 to predict subsequent elections. Denoting t s the …rst election after 1985 in state s, this instrument assigns elections to years t s; t s + 5; t s + 10; and t s + 15: One disadvantage 14 Results are robust to clustering by state. Serial correlation is less of a concern here than in a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erence setting, because the election cycle dummies exhibit only weakly negative serial correlation. 15 The results reported here are robust to an alternative instrument which uses information on elections only prior to 1990. Denoting t s the …rst election after 1985 in state s, this instrument assigns elections to years t s; t s + 5; t s + 10; and t s + 15: However, because the cycle results resemble a sine function, this approach provides relatively less power. I therefore "reset" the instrument after an early election.
of this approach is that, because the cycle results resemble a sine function, it provides substantially less power.
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The IV equivalent would use the S The results indicate that agricultural credit issued by public banks is lower in the years that were four, three, and two years prior to an election than in the years before an election or election years. The di¤erence, of up to 8 percentage points, is substantial given that the average growth rate of real agricultural credit issued by public sector banks was 0.5% over the sample period. Cycles are not observed in non-agricultural lending, though the point estimates are negative and consistent with a smaller cycle.
While cycles are not observed for private banks, the standard errors on the cycle dummies are much larger than those for public sector banks, and cycles in private banks cannot be ruled out. Could it be that increased public sector lending simply crowds out private sector lending in election years, while private banks pick up the lending slack in the years between elections? The relative size of the two bank groups rules out this possibility: private sector banks issue only approximately ten percent of credit in India, and are underweight in their exposure to agricultural credit. Thus, an eight percent decline in the amount of agricultural credit issued by public sector banks would have to be met by an almost doubling of the amount of agricultural credit issued by private sector banks, an amount far beyond the con…dence interval of the estimated size of a cycle for private banks. Thus, while public bank lending may crowd out private credit, there is still a large aggregate e¤ect. Table 4 investigates how the nature of lending varies over the political cycle. I …rst examine loan volume. An increase in lending could be due to changes on the extensive margin, with banks lending to additional borrowers, as well as the intensive margin, with banks making larger loans. I …nd evidence for both: the o¤-election cycle dummies are negative for both the average agricultural loan size, and the number of agricultural loans. Their magnitude is consistent with the magnitude e¤ects found in Table 3 (credit volume=number of loans * average size), though because the size of the decline of each component is mechanically smaller than the decline in volume, the components are not always statistically distinguishable from zero. There is no systematic variation in loan size or number of loans for private banks.
The Type of Credit
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Interest rates from public banks do not change with the increase in lending. Interestingly, however, private sector banks seem to charge higher rates for agricultural loans in non-election years, with a di¤erence of up to 50 basis points between peak and trough years. It may well be that, in election years, private banks lower the interest rate they charge for agricultural loans in order to attract borrowers who might otherwise …nd credit on more favorable terms from public sector banks.
Political Cycles and Loan Default
What are the real e¤ects of this observed distortion? I begin this section by investigating whether the electoral cycle a¤ects the rate of default among agricultural loans. I then test directly whether more government credit from public banks leads to greater agricultural output.
In a study on Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) document that loans made by public sector banks to …rms controlled by politicians are much more likely to end up in default.
In this section, we demonstrate that electoral considerations a¤ect loan default for loans made to the general public as well.
I estimate the reduced form relationship between agricultural credit default rates and the electoral cycle. I use three measures of default rate: the log volume of late credit, the share of loans late, and the share of credit late. Loans are coded as late if they are past due by at least six months. Most agricultural loans are short-term credit, meant to be repaid after the growing season. (Summary statistics are given in Table 1 ). The results, from equation 3 are presented in Table 5 . There is a large cycle in the volume of late agricultural loans: the amount increases 16% in government-owned banks in scheduled election years relative to the trough two years prior to the election. Credit is increasing in election years, so one might naturally expect the volume of bad loans to increase (Panel B), especially if the marginal borrower is higher-risk during a credit expansion. However, the size of the cycle in default is much larger than the credit cycle: the di¤erence from peak to trough in credit volume is 8%, but it is 15% for the volume of loans in default. It is unlikely that this eight percent expansion in credit volume (particularly given that the number of loans increases less than the volume) would lead to such high default, if loans were made purely on a commercial basis.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The fact that the share of agricultural credit marked late from public banks drops following the election year may seem initially puzzling: these are presumably the years in which electoral loans come to maturation. However, this is likely explained by the fact that politicians induce banks to write o¤ loans following elections. The popular press contains many reports of these political promises. For example, in 1987 the Chief Minister of Haryana promised to write o¤ all agricultural loans under 20,000 during the election campaign. Following his victory, he held his promise. (Shalendra D. Sharma, 1999, p. 207 ). The evidence in Table 5 supports the view that this behavior is common in India. 19 We explore this further in section 3.3.1. (1) and (2) give the results for public banks, while those in (3) and (4) give them for private banks. The second two rows interact election with measures of loan default. The point estimates on are negative, but insigni…cant. The mean value of Share of Agricultural Loans Late is 0.1, with a standard deviation of 0.1. Thus, taking the point estimates at face value, comparing a district with 19 The data do not indicate when the loans were made, so it is not possible to distinguish at which point in the election cycle defaulting loans were issued. 20 I take district characteristics at the beginning of the time period: there is no time variation in these.
What
The share of loans late is calculated as of 1992, while the population variables are from the 1991 census.
30% default to one with 10% default, the size of the cycle would be approximately two percentage points smaller in the region with higher default rates.
Most theories of political cycles require asymmetric information between politicians and voters. Shi and Svensson (2006) I also …nd results consistent with previous …ndings on education. Cycles are signi…-cantly smaller in areas with higher literacy, and in which a higher share of the population has graduated from primary school. These same results hold for other schooling levels.
Results are generally similar if actual, rather than scheduled, election year is used.
A recent paper (Khemani, 2007) suggests that central government budget allocations are subject to political in ‡uence: the government transfers greater resources to politically important states. However, I do not …nd evidence that the size of the lending cycle depends on whether the state government is a¢ liated with the central ruling party.
How are Resources Targeted?
In this subsection, I examine whether agricultural credit varies with the margin of victory enjoyed by the current ruling party in each district. Credit is observed at the district level, and as there are multiple constituencies within a district, it is necessary to aggre- 
The estimates are reported in column (2) of Table 7 . For public sector banks, the coe¢ - 21 In scheduled election years, the margin of victory of the incumbent party is used. The margin of victory of the majority party is used in scheduled election years -4 and -3. In scheduled election years -2 and -1, the ruling party is again de…ned as the incumbent party, but their margin of victory is assigned using the upcoming election results. To the extent that politicians know in which districts the race will be competitive, this should be a valid proxy for expected competitiveness. 
and
where I M dt >0 is an indicator function taking the value of 1 when M dt >0, and 0 otherwise. (The regression on which the graph is based is given below in equation 6). The topmost graph gives the predicted relationship four years prior to the next scheduled election (and therefore one year after the previous election): the slightly negative slope for positive margins of victory indicates that districts in which the average margin of victory is greater than zero received slightly less credit. The slope of the lines are not statistically distinguishable from zero.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The second panel in Figure 1 , for the year three years prior to the next scheduled election, continues to indicate a relatively ‡at relationship: credit did not vary with previous margin of victory. The same holds for two years before the election and one year before the election. In a scheduled election year, however, there is a pronounced upsidedown V shape: the predicted amount of credit going to very close districts is substantially greater than credit in districts that were not close.
The graph is based on the following regression: 
where M cdst is the margin of victory in constituency c in district d in state s in the most recent election in year t, and N d is the number of constituencies in a district. Estimating
with analogous replacements for the interaction terms, resolves this measurement error problem. The estimated equation is thus:
Because electoral outcomes within a district are indeed correlated, the results are very similar, and again suggest targeting in an election year, but no relationship in o¤-years.
Figures 2 and 3 graph the information from the level and growth regressions of equation 6 in another way. They trace credit for both public and private sector banks, over the election cycle. Figure 2 gives the relationship for a notional "swing" district (M dt = 0), while Figure 3 gives the same relationship for a notional district whose margin of victory was 15 percentage points in the previous election. Public sector grows sharply prior to an election, increasing 10 percentage points between the year two years prior to the election and election time. Predicted credit from private banks is ‡at over the cycle.
[FIGURE 2 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The results reported here are robust to using year, rather than region-year, …xed e¤ects, as well as to restricting the sample to the major states of India. I estimated quadratic speci…cations, but found no strong evidence of non-linearities. A …nal robustness check involves calculating the share of constituencies in a district in which the incumbent enjoys a positive margin of victory (F p ), and computing the average of these positive margins of victory M The time-series and cross-sectional evidence of manipulation of public resources supports the idea that credit is used by politicians to maximize electoral gains, rather than reward core supporters. Are the credit booms around elections simply bad loans to friends of politicians that will not be repaid, or is it only when the threat of a re-election looms that politicians ensure that the banks are ful…lling their legal obligation to provide credit to the poorer sections of society? Even if the additional credit is "good"credit, it is very di¢ cult to imagine that the socially optimal allocation of agricultural credit is coincident with the electoral cycle.
The cross-sectional data give support to an even stronger presumption that the observed patterns are ine¢ cient. Surely districts whose population are strongly in favor (or opposed to) the incumbent majority party do not need relatively less agricultural credit in election years than districts that are more evenly split. Even if the additional credit generated by political competition is welfare-improving, it is not at all obvious why it should be targeted towards districts with electorally even races. 22 I thank the editor for this suggestion.
Targeted Loan Enforcement and Forgiveness
Results in section 3.2.3 suggest that loan enforcement and forgiveness may also have a political component. A nearly ideal mechanism allowing a politician to buy votes would be to induce a bank to lend to individuals, promising to forgive loans if she or he wins the election. In this section, I examine whether loan enforcement and forgiveness is targeted towards speci…c constituencies.
[ there is no evidence of systematic targeting.
Column (3) examines the share of credit marked in default, for public banks: in an election year, close districts experience a lower share than non-competitive districts. While this may be at least partially driven by the aggregate increase in lending in close districts, the size of the drop is too large to be explained by this alone. Rather, loan write-o¤s (or greater repayment) must occur. In the year following an election, districts with large margins of victory experience signi…cant drops in the share of lending, while those with negative margins of victory for the majority party do not. In other election years, there is no statistical relationship between the share of credit in default and lending behavior.
The results in this section suggest that politicians reward their supporters immediately following elections, by causing banks to write o¤ loans to borrowers in constituencies in which politicians enjoyed the greatest support. These patterns stand in contrast to those for lending, where only marginal districts were rewarded. It may well be that the politicians o¤er di¤erential inducement before and following the election. Before the election, loans may win votes. Following the elections, politicians focus rewards on their supporters.
4 Is Redistribution Costly?
Lending Booms and Agricultural Output
Perhaps the best way to evaluate the cost of cycles is to measure whether the loans are put to productive use. That is, does credit a¤ect agricultural output? This question cannot be answered by measuring correlations between credit and agricultural output:
omitted factors, such as agricultural productivity, crop prices or idiosyncratic shocks will almost surely bias any estimate. The lending booms documented in Section 3.2 suggest an instrument for the e¢ cacy of politically-induced lending: the electoral cycle induces a supply shock uncorrelated with other confounding factors.
23
Most agricultural loans are short-term credit, for the purchase of inputs such as fertilizer and seed. If additional credit leads to a more e¢ cient use of inputs, and increases output, then the costs of political interference may be limited to sub-optimal allocation of credit to farmers. On the other hand, if the additional credit has no e¤ect on agricultural output, this suggests that either the loans are used for very ine¢ cient investment in agriculture, or they are simply consumed by the borrowing population.
To answer this question, I use data on agricultural output (revenue and yield) at the district level. The data set was initially assembled by Dinar et al (1998) for the time period . It has been supplemented by Rohini Pande. I use two measures of agricultural output. The …rst is log aggregate agricultural revenue, at the district level.
One di¢ culty with the data is that missing observations are relatively common. Thus, it is not possible to calculate logrevenue dt =log P i2Crops p i;dt q i;dt for all districts. It would not be correct to replace missing quantities with zero, as that would induce substantial, potentially non-random variation in measured revenue. I therefore calculate revenue, using for each district only the set of crops for which there are no missing values from 1992 to 1999. To measure yield, I take the average yield of all crops (y c;dt ) in a district, weighted by acres planted, a cdt : Thus, yield dt = 1 P i2crops a c;dt P i2Crops c;dt y c;dt : Because the frequency of missing data is relatively high (some states have output for only one or two years), the size of the sample shrinks considerably, to 106 districts, over 8 years, located in only six states.
24 Because the number of states is low, I use year, rather than region-year, …xed e¤ects, when estimating equation 7.
Panel A of Table 9 presents the reduced form relationships between credit, output, and the electoral cycle. The coe¢ cients on A k are included in the regressions but suppressed from the table for notational simplicity. As in the full sample, the electoral cycle dummies and margin of victory variables serve as powerful predictors of agricultural credit. The …rst line of Panel A gives the results for public banks only. However, since I am unable to determine which agricultural output is …nanced by public vs. private banks, the relevant variable of interest for the structural equation is aggregate agricultural credit. The second row of Panel A gives the relationship, and again electoral variables predict credit. The null hypothesis that the electoral coe¢ cients , and do not a¤ect credit can be rejected at less than 0.1% level.
The next two rows give the reduced form relationship between agricultural revenue, 24 The states, are, however, among the most important in India: Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Madyha Pradesh, and Karntaka. and output, and the electoral cycle. While 1 , the dummy on S 1 dt is negative and signi…cant for revenue, there is no systematic relationship between the electoral cycle and revenue. The point estimates on 4 and 2 are positive, but statistically indistinguishable from zero. The reduced-form relationship for output is similar: only 2 is statistically signi…cant from zero, and there is no pattern between credit and electoral cycles.
In Panel B, I estimate the structural relationship between yield and credit, and output and credit:
using the electoral variables as instruments for credit. The OLS relationship between yield and output, and credit, is given in the …rst column of panel B.
For both measures of output, the point estimate of the e¤ect of credit on output is very close to zero. Unfortunately, the estimates are quite imprecise, with large standard errors. Nevertheless, there is no systematic relationship between credit and output.
A previous version of this paper conducted the same exercise, using state-level data on agricultural output. State-level agricultural data are available for 14 states. I found that while credit varied with the electoral cycle, output did not. The IV estimates were similarly imprecise.
Thus, while credit does go up in election years, there is no evidence that agricultural output does so.
Conclusion
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that politicians will manipulate resources under their control in order to achieve electoral success. Yet, compelling examples of this manipulation are rarely documented in the literature. The …rst contribution of this paper is to develop an improved framework for testing for tactical redistribution. Combining models of time-series manipulation with models of cross-sectional redistribution yields predictions for the distribution of resources across time and space that are very unlikely to be explained by omitted factors. These predictions are tested using data from agricultural credit from public sector banks in India. I …nd evidence of political lending cycles.
Moreover, credit is targeted towards districts in which the majority party just won or just lost the election. This targeting is observed only in election years. Finally, a separate pattern of targeting is observed for loan write-o¤s, than for lending: write-o¤s are greatest in the districts in which the winning party enjoyed the greatest electoral success; this pattern is observed only following an election, not prior to it.
The second contribution of this paper is to measure the cost of these observed distortions. A loan-level analysis demonstrates that election cycles induced credit booms in agricultural credit in election years. However, these booms induced substantially higher default rates. Electoral cycles serve as an instrument for identifying the e¤ect of marginal loans on output, providing evidence that increased levels of credit from public sector banks do not a¤ect aggregate agricultural output at the state level.
The third contribution of this paper is to provide a better understanding of why government ownership of banks has negative e¤ects on real economic outcomes. Arguments against government ownership of banks typically rest on two premises: government enterprises are less e¢ cient, and their resources are misused by politicians. This paper provides a clear example of the latter, and suggests that the costs of misuse are so great that additional government credit may have no e¤ect on output. This is a particularly important policy question, since government ownership of banks is very prevalent in developing countries, and …nancial development may be a key determinant of economic growth.
It is worth noting that these results are not inconsistent with the …nding of that rural banks reduce poverty. Their results suggest that the presence of any bank in a village will reduce poverty, but they do not distinguish between public and private sector banks. Of particular relevance to their …ndings is the result in this paper that government banks su¤er substantially higher default rates. Burgess and Pande are agnostic on whether the bene…ts of rural branch expansion outweighed the cost, precisely because the rural default rates were so high.
This paper also helps interpret tests for redistribution. Previous empirical work has ignored the time series dimension, and may not provide an accurate picture, since redistribution may only occur in periods just before an election. Second, the …nding of targeting towards "swing districts" suggests why approaches using regression-discontinuity design (e.g., Miguel and Zaidi (2003) ) …nd no e¤ect of politics on the allocation of goods. If resources are targeted towards swing districts, there will be no discontinuity between a constituency in which the ruling party just won the previous election or just lost it.
The …ndings reported here are important, in terms of understanding the costs of redistribution. The magnitudes are considerable: the estimated e¤ect of 5-10% higher levels of credit in election years is substantially larger than the average annual growth rate of credit. E¤orts to isolate government banks from political pressure, as is done with many central banks, may reduce these e¤ects. Politicians appear to care more about winning re-election than rewarding their supporters, and they do so by targeting "swing" districts.
Data Appendix
The unit of observation throughout the study varies. Section 3 uses credit and political data at the district level. The most comprehensive sample includes data from 412 districts, Scheduled Election in k years is a dummy indicating whether the next scheduled election will occur in k years.
Notes: The unit of observation is the district-year. The sample used to estimate political cycles only (Tables 4-5) contains data from 412 districts in 19 states, over the period 1992-1999, for a total of 3296 observations. Political data were not available for all districts, so the analysis which includes "Margin of Victory" contains data from 348 districts in 19 states, over the period 1992-1999. The credit variables are the log value of the amount of credit issued by the specified group of banks (all credit, public credit only, or private credit.) Private banks are not present in all districts: thus, the number of observations is lower. Margin of Victory is defined as the average share by which the majority party in the state won the district in the previous election. If there was no majority, then all parties in the ruling coalition are coded as "majority" party. Margin ranges from -1 to 1. Notes: Each cell represents a regression. The coefficient reported is a dummy for election year (Panel A), scheduled election year (Panel B), and election year instrumented with scheduled election year (Panel C.) The dependent variable is annual change in log real levels of credit. In addition to the indicated dependent variable of interest, all regressions include district and region-year fixed effects, and a measure of annual rainfall.
The unit of observation is district-year. There are data for 348 districts from 1992-1999, though private banks do not operate in all districts. Standard errors are clustered by state-year.
The first stage of the IV regression in Panel C is: (1) and (2) the dependent variable is volume of delinquent agricultural credit; in columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is share of agricultural credit that is delinquent. The independent variables of interest are a set of dummy variables indicating the number of years until the next scheduled election, and the average margin by which candidates from the party (or coalition) currently in power in the state won (or lost) in the specific district. Each regression also includes district and region-year fixed effects, and average annual rainfall in the district. (0.047) (0.409) Notes: Each cell represents a single regression. Data are available for 106 districts, located within 6 states, for the period 1992-1999. The dependent variables of interest are revenue (column 1) and output (column 2). The OLS relationship is given in the first row. An instrumental variables estimate is given in the second row. Four dummies for the election schedule, along with the absolute value of the margin of victory enjoyed by the ruling party (interacted with each election cycle dummy) serve as instruments. The null hypothesis that the instruments do not predict aggregate credit can be rejected at the 0.1% level. All regressions include district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and rainfall. 
